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Summary  findings
Ten years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive  Both the design and effective  implementation of such
that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform  measures are important if a market system is to be
efforts. Broadman and Recanatini present an analytical  effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate
framework for examining the role market institutions  laws if they are not enforced.
play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently  The local political economy greatly affects whether a
available  data on the incidence of corruption and on  given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially
institutional development, they provide preliminary  important are the following factors in the political
evidence on the link between the development of market  economy:
institutions and incentives  for corruption.  *  The credibility of the government's commitment to
Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to  carrying out annoanced reforms.
be important, but three are statistically  significant:  * The degree to which government officials  are
* The intensity of barriers to the entry of new  captured by the entities they regulate or oversee.
business.  o  The stability of the government itself.
* The effectiveness  of the legal system.  *  The political power of entrenched vested interests.
* The efficacy  and competitiveness of services  Economists in the field of industrial organization,
provided by infrastructure monopolies.  antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these
The main lesson emerging  from their analysis: a well  factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior,
established system of market institutions - clear and  corruption, and "capture" of government officials. Only
transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances  now are they becoming conventional wisdom among
(including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust  specialists in economies in transition.
competitive environment - reduces opportunities for
rent-seeking and hence incentives  for corruption.
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In recent years  the fight against  corruption has become a key element in the policy  agenda  of
many governments  and international  development agencies. As emphasized by a growing  literature,
corruption affects growth and investment, making its eradication a fundarnental challenge for the
long-term development of  many countries  (amnong  others,  see  Mauro,  1995; Bardhan,  1997;
Kaufmann et al., 1999a;  Wei, 1999).
The  causes and  origins of  corruption, however, are less  clear and  less systematically
investigated,  with few empirical  studies on the nature and extent of the determinants of corruption
available., Despite the limited evidence on the causes of corruption, researchers  and policy-makers
agree that  corruption  thrives  in  environments plagued by  institutional deficiencies and  non-
transparent regulations (World Bank,  1997a).2  Thus,  it  is to  be  expected that  incentives for
corruption would emerge especially during periods of systemic regimne  change, such as for  the
countries making  the transition from a planned to a market economy.
Ten years into the  transition process, corruption is now  recognized to  be  a  pervasive
phenomenon that can seriously jeopardize the best  intentioned reform efforts.  Because of the
complex and deep political economy dynamics surrounding the process transition economies are
undergoing-fundamentally replacing entrenched policy frameworks  and vested interests regulated
by a regime  of conmmand  and control with new policy  structures and institutions governed by market
incentives-it  is essential  for policy-makers  to understand the causes  of corruption.
This paper develops an analytical  framework for examining  the role basic market institutions
play as determinants of rent-seeking and illicit behavior in transition economies.  Using data only
recently available  on the incidence of corruption and institutional  development in such economies,
we  provide some  preliminary evidence on  the  linkage between the  development  of  market
institutions and incentives for corruption.  In  addition, we explore the  relative roles of different
market  institutions  on corruption.
Although the complexity  of the issues and the lirnited data available  call for caution, our
cross-country exploration provides important  indicative results. Utilizing various indicators for
different  dimensions of  market  institutions in  transition  economies  based  on  our  analytical
framework, and after controlling for  other factors that  may affect corruption suggested in the
literature, we find empirically  that these institutional indicators are systemically  associated with the
incidence of corruption in a broad set of transition economies. While virtually  all of the indicators
we examine appear to be important,  three emerge as especially  statistically  significant:  the intensity  of
barriers to  new business entry, the  effectiveness of  the  legal system  and  the  efficacy and
competitiveness  of services  provided by infrastructure monopolies.
The main lesson from our analysis  is that a well-established  system of market institutions-
one characterized  by clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances, including
strong  enforcement  mechanisms,  and  a  robust  competitive  environment-reduces  rent-seeking
opportunities and, in turn, the incentives  for corruption.  Our empirical  investigation  points to the
I Exceptions  are  Ades  and  Di  Tella  (1999),  which  explores  the link  between  corruption  and  degree  of  foreign  competition;
and  Treisman  (1999),  which  analyzes  the effect  of historical  and  cultural  traditions,  economic  development  and  political
institutions  on  corruption..
2 Klitgaard  (1996)  has attempted  to fonnalize  this intuition  introducing  an interesting,  yet sirnple  model  to explain
corruption:  C(corruption)  = M(monopoly  power)  + D (discretion)  -A(accountability)
i.e  corruption  depends  on  the amount  of  monopoly  power  and  discretionary  power  that  officials  exercise  and  the  degree  to
whlich  they  are  held  accountable  for  their  actions.importance  of  both the des'n  and q)iaie inetion  of  such measures  to  promote the
establishment  of an effective  market  system in other  words,  it is not enough,  for example,  to simply
enact first class laws if they are not enforced. In this regard,  the dynamics  engendered  by the
tensions  in a country's  political  economy  regime  play  a crucial  role  in deterrnining  the extent  to which
implementation  of a given policy  reformn  wil  be successful  in curtailing  corruption.  Indeed,
throughout  our analysis  we emphasize  the importance  of political  economy  factors-the credibility
and commitment  of government  to carry  out announced  reforms,  the degree  to which  government
officials  are captured  by the entities  they  regulate/oversee,  the stability  of the government  itself,  and
the political  power of entrenched  vested  interests. These  factors  have long been recognized  as
potent  determinants  of opportunistic  behavior  and corruption  by  economists  in the field  of industrial
organization,  antitrust  and regulation;  only now are they becoming  conventional  wisdom  among
specialists  in econormies  in transition. 3
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In  the next five sections  we outline the
characteristics  of a particular  set of econonic reforms  to establish  basic market institutions  in
economies  in transition.  Specifically  we focus  on: (i) price and  production  liberalization;  (ii)  policies
to engender  competition  among  enterprises;  (ii) regulatory  reform  of infrastructure  monopolies;  (iv)
corporate  governance  reforms;  and (v) openness  to foreign  trade  and direct  investment.  Although
the five  reform  areas  are  described  separately,  our analytical  framework  points  to the need  for policy
makers  to recognize  there are significant  interactions  and synergies  across  these reforms,  and that
policies  need to be designed  and implemented  in an  trated fashion  to be effective  in reducing
mcentives  for corruption. In the five sections we present  basic graphical/bivariate  empirical
evidence  on the degree  of implementation  of each  type of institutional  reform  and the incidence  of
corruption  in a set of transition  countries. In the sixth section,  using  the same set of transition
economies  we present  the results  of multivariate  statistical  analysis,  which  helps shed light  on the
relative  importance  of each institutional  reform in explaining  cross-country  differences  in the
incidence  of corruption.  The final section concludes  with suggestions  for strengthening  and
expanding  research  on this issue.
i.  PRICE  AND  PRODUCTION  LIBERALIZATION
Price  liberalization  reforms  are  powerful  tools to curb  rent-seeking  and corruption  since  they
imply  the reduction  of discretion  and distortions  in the allocation  of resources  in a country  and
promote efficiency. In particular,  the application  of market-determnined  prices and production
decisions:
(9 engenders  self-regulating,  atomistic  discipline  on producers  to behave competitively,
where  prices  are  cost-based  with  little  discretion  exercised  and
(ii)  reduces  scope of opportunities  for government  intervention/discretion  in the supply-
demand  equilibration  process;  imposition  of 'hard budget constraints'  is a critical  pressure  point
throughout  a country's  market  system.
But poorly  designed  and inadequately  implemented  price liberalization  reforms  may  create
more  incentives  for corruption,  since  they  may  serve  the vested  interests  of an elite  class. It is key  in
fact to focus on the design and the implementation  of price and production  liberalization  to
understand  its link  with  corruption.
3 For a recent  analysis  of the role  of the  political  economy  conditions  in  explaining  the reform  process,  see  EBRD  (1999).
2On one hand,  liberalization  reforms  reduce  corruption  only  if they  facilitate  the creation  of a
transparent  mechanism  for the allocation  of resources. If the price and production  liberalization
processes  themnselves  are not trapa  ret, for example,  or there is uwwrss  in the application  of
liberalization  (subsidies  are eliminated  in certain  sectors  but maintained  for others),  then politicians
and bureaucrats  enjoy greater discretionary  power, increasing  the possibility  for abuses and
corruption. Government  follow-through  on announced  liberalization  is critical.  Comprehensive
price liberalization  reforms,  approved  by government  but not effectively  implemented  or credibly
launched,  create  in fact  more  incentives  for abuse  and illicit  behavior.
A closer  look at the recent  experience  of some transition  countries  supports  the need  for
carefully  designed  and effectively  implemented  price and production  liberalization  reformrs  as a
powerful  tool to reduce  corruption. Table 1 illustrates  the degree  of corruption  existing  in these
countries  through two different indices  of corruption:  the Corruption  Perception  Index (CPI)
prepared  by Transparency  Intemational4,  and the Index of Graft (G)  calculated  by Kaufmann,
Kraay  and Zoido-Lobaton5  (1999). Tables  2 and 3 present  various  summary  indicators  of progress
made  by  26  transition  countries  in the reform  of basic  market  institutions  along  several  dimensions.
The simple  snap-shot  picture  of the transition  process  depicted  by these  tables  provides  us
with evidence  of the link between  corruption  and the extent to which the reform of market
institutions  have  been  carried  out. The main  lesson  we can derive  from these  data  is that countries
that have  systemically  liberalized  prices  and production  decisions,  applied  hard budget  constraints,
and  eliminated  or significantly  reduced  subsidies6  in a uniform,  transparent  manner  have  substantially
reduced  the incentives  for corruption.  On the other  hand, where  any  of these  reforms  have  not been
introduced  or poorly  implemented,  we  observe  a growing  incidence  of corruption.
Consider,  for example,  the degree  of corruption  in Poland and Hungary  versus  Russia  and
Belarus. In Russia  and Belarus,  prices  are still controlled  for several  important  product  categories
and State  procurement  at non-market  prices  remains  substantial,  as summanrized  by the EBRD  price
liberalization  score  of 1.7. At the same  time,  both economriies  face  a fairly  high  degree  of corruption.
On the other hand, in Poland and Hungary,  two countries  experiencing  a much lower degree  of
corruption,  the price  liberalization  process  has been  more comprehensive,  and substantial  progress
has  been  made  in phasing  out non-competitive  State  procurement.
Similar  considerations  can be derived  by examining  the relationship  between  the degree  of
corruption  and  the presence  of soft budget  constraints  and arrears,  described  in Table  3 and Figures
1  and 2. Countries  where firms' enjoyment  of softer budget constraints  and arrears  is a more
common practice  are associated  with higher levels  of corruption 7. In particular,  in the Baltic
4 The  CPI  relates  to perceptions  of the degree  of corruption  as  seen  by  business  people,  risk  analysts  and the general  public,
and  is compiled  using  infonnation  from  up to 12  individual  surveys.  The  values  reported  are  calculated  for 1999  and  range
between  0 (ighly  corrupted  environment)  and 10  (not  corrupted).
5 This index  is derived  using an unobserved components model and data from 12 different  sources. The index ranges from
-2.5 (highly  corrupted) to 2.5 (not corrupted).
6  The analysis  of the change in budgetary subsidies does not  seem to corroborate this hypothesis, as the comparison
between the case of Azerbaijan and Estonia (or Slovenia)  may suggest.  Between 1994 and 1997  budgetary subsidies  in
Azerbaijan  decreased  from 5.4%  to 0.7%  of the GDP.  Over the same period of time, subsidies  in Estonia went from 0.9%
to  0.3%  of the GDP.  Cormption is however much less endemic in Estonia than  in Azerbaijan.  This  apparent
contradiction  simply  highlights  the importance of including  in our measures of subsidies  estimates  for implicit  subsidies  and
cross-subsidies.
7 In all  the diagrams  presented throughout this work we choose to use the CPI index as our measure  of corruption existing
in a particular  country. It is irnportant to stress  that this choice does not affect qualitatively  our resuts since the two indices
are highly correlated. Examining our diagrams,  the reader should also keep in mind that a lower values of this index
describes  an economy  in which  the extent of corruption is more pervasive.
3countries, arrears and soft  budget constraints are not  a  feasible option for  firms.  This more
disciplined  business environment has reduced the incentives  for corruption, as indicated by the CPI
score for these countries. On the other hand, countries like  Georgia or Azerbaijan,  where firms are
able to resort to these practices,  have been hindered by widespread  corruption.
This preliminary  evidence shows that the liberalization  of prices and the application  of hard
budget  constraints are  clear reform  priorities to  create  an  enabling environment for  market
institutions  and legal frameworks  to take root and thus set strong signals for combating corruption
and to engender investment and growth.  The transition process of course necessitates  dealing with
inherited social  burdens carefully  and with sensitivity,  and this should be done through transparent
means-tested or targeted income support.  But letting market forces set relative prices is an absolute
critical  prerequisite.
We emphasize, however, that  success in iniplementation of the aforementioned reforns
relies on  additional factors, namely the  existence of strong political will at the highest levels of
government;  the presence of competitively  structured industries,  bolstered by conditions facilitating
new entrants;  and openness to international  trade and foreign  direct investment. Weakness  in any of
these areas will undermiine  the impact price and production liberalization will have on reducing
incentives  for corruption and may well  become counter-productive.
2.  COMPETITION  POLICY  (NON-UTILITY  SECTOR)
The industrial  sectors that many formerly planned economies inherited at the beginning of
the transition were not competitively  structured, often characterized  by large plants and companies
relative to the actual (market) demand, resulting in diseconomies of scale and scope.  The great
emphasis  placed on heavy industrialization  at the expense of underdeveloped services  during central
planning led to the creation of this highly  concentrated industrial  structure. In addition, the central
planning system actively promoted  regional autarky and  self-sufficiency, resulting in  artificially
geographically  located industries and "duplication of facilities". Because  of socialist  objectives,  these
plants were designed to  produce product mixes that  were not  necessarily in line with market
preferences. Their production decisions  were dictated by state orders and/or military  needs, rather
than  by supply and demand forces.  All these factors have contributed to  an  anti-competitive
structural  inheritance  for a wide array of transition  countries; two prominent examples  are China and
Russia.8
Such  a  distorted  business  structure  can  easily foster  corruption  unless  competitive
restructuning  reforms and checks and  balances are put  in place.  Allowing for  the free play of
competitive forces is essential if firms are to have little (if any) direct effect on market prices and
prices are  set  in  line  with  costs.  Competitive discipline-along  with  price  and  production
liberalization-is key to reducing discretionary  behavior by both business and government officials,
especially  in the latter case where, within state owned enterprises (SOEs) there is weak separation
between  the interests of business and government (see the section below on corporate govemance).
Competition also provides for an efficient  allocation and use of resources, and improvements and
innovations  in product and service quality.
In the main,  where business environments  are poorly structured competitively,  opportunities
for  rent-seeking behavior can arise from  two  different but  interactive elements that  promote
8 For a discussion of structural conditions for competition in China and Russia, see Broadmnan  (1995) and Broadman (in
press), respectively.
4discretion  and special  interests. On the one hand, barriers  to new private sector entrants  that
otherwise  would  exert  competitive  discipline  and reduce  protection  prolong  the discretionary  power
of the old business  elite and hamper the restructuring  process.  On the other hand, seller
concentration  among  incumbent  firms fosters anti-competitive  conduct and collusion  resulting  in
inefficient  production  and labor  hiring  decisions,  price  distortions,  and poor product  quality.  These
two features  of market  structure  are  closely  related  to the political  economy  interests  driven  by the
government  capture  - the impact  of firm's  activities  on government  decision-making.  Together,
these factors  create  strong resistance  to change  and the introduction  of competitive  forces,  thus
facilitating  the emergence  of corruption.
It is central  for transition  economies  to implement  an effective  competition  policy  regime  in
order curb corruption.  Such  a policy  framework  should  be characterized  by pro-active,  transparent
and even-handed  competitive  restructuring  of irn  ntfimn,  which  allows  for horizontal  and vertical
divestiture  of integrated  firms operating  beyond  the point of scale economies  and the exit of
insolvent  and value-subtracting  firms bottling  up assets  that otherwise  can be deployed  to higher
values  in use. In addition,  it should  create  a clear  rules-based  enabling  environmnent  encompassing  a
level "playing  field" for new business  enrants;  and a set of effectively  imposed  penaltis  for anti-
ampetitiw  ma)ia,  such as collusion,  anti-competitive  mergers,  price  fixing  and/or predatory  pricing,
and false  advertising.
Table  2 presents  an index  that summarizes  the degree  to which  competition  policy  reforms
have  been  introduced  in each  of 26 transition  economies.  As can  be seen,  there  is wide  variation:  a
value  of 1, scored  by countries  such as Tajikistan  or Turkmenistan,  describes  an economy  in which
competition  policy  legislation  and institutions  are very undeveloped;  and a value of 3 describes
countries  with well  developed  competition  policy  instruments,  such as strong safeguards  against
abuse  of market  power  and prevention  of entry.
In Figures  3 and 4 we present evidence  on the extent  to which a more competitive  and
transparent  environrnent  reduces  the incentives  for rent-seeking  behavior and corruption. In
particular,  we consider  the relationship  between  barriers  to entry and exit and the degree of
corruption  existing  in a country. The figures  suggest  the existence  of a positive  relationship:  the
greater  the barriers  to entry  and exit  faced  by firms,  and therefore  the greater  the distortions  existing
in the competitive  environment,  the more  widespread  is corruption.  9
A similar  relationship  exists  between  corruption  and the extensiveness  and the effectiveness
of  generic (i) comnmercial  and financial  laws and regulations,  and (ii) the  infrastructure  for
enforcement of such institutions, such as the development of the judiciary. In Table 2 we present
indices across  countries that describe  the extent and soundness of these factors, and Figures 5 and 6
offer some evidence  of the existence  of a positive association  between the degree of corruption and
the lack of development  and/or clarity  of such systems.
Consider  for example the cases of Georgia and Belarus,  which score poorly in these indices.
Their low values  reflect a situation in which company laws are limited  in scope and commercial  legal
rules are unclear and sometimes contradictory.10 This in turn leads to  greater opportunities for
9 The  intensity  of entry  barriers  is  a composite  of the six  main  barriers  to entry  and expansion  as perceived  by  start-ups.  The
intensity  of exit  barriers  instead  is a soft budget  index  comnposed  of subsidies  and barter  measures.  For details  on their
construction,  see  Dutz and Vagliasindi  (1999)
10  An  equally  interesting  relationship  to explore  is the one between  corruption  and the degree  of legal  effectiveness.  Many
transition  economies  have  introduced  a number  of commercial  laws  and regulations  in recent  years,  as the EBRD  scores
show.  The  general  effectiveness  of the legal  system  and courts  and  a persistent  gap between  introduction  and  enforcement
of the laws  create  greater  incentives  for corruption. At this stage,  however,  very  limited  data on effectiveness  of legal
systemns  is available.
5opportunistic  behavior.  High  index  values,  in  contrast,  describe  econormies  endowed  with
comprehensive  legislation and where the  administrative and judicial support  of the  law is reasonably
adequate.  This is the  case of Slovenia and Hungary, correspondingly, the phenomenon  of corruption
is less pervasive in these two countnres.
The recent  experiences of transition  countries  provide us with some  valuable lessons  as to
which  are  the  most  effective  competition  policy  frameworks.  In  particular,  the  following
characteristics are common  to the  most effective competition  policy regimes:
(i) stivg  i  eatioal  best practiae  ctetition  policy law  (demonstrating  "buy-in"  from  the
legislature);
(ii) qe]tie  cwtwetition  exeatiw agrries that  (i) have  "political  teeth"  in  the  Cabinet  and  are
independent  from line ministries; (ii) have strong central-local networks to combat  regulatory capture
and  protection  of  local champions  by  local  officials; (iii) hold  public  hearings  with  a transparent
appeals process; and (iv) impose penalties matching harm inflicted;
(iii) systemic  use  of  ndJ-basd,  st=aii4  and  trampayent  bsiness  YEgistrantion  and licring
pnrxakes  ("one stop"  shops) for domestic  as weLl  as for foreign direct investment;" 1
(iv) styg  judiaaries  with adequately trained judges and  an effective bailiff system to  enforce
judgements; and
(v) eeaPwe  bankruptcy  legal frameworks  and efonmnnr  nanzisnv,  including both  in-court and
out-of-court  procedures that engender the protection  of creditors' rights.
To be sure, this is a formidable  agenda and priorities must  be set.  Our experience  suggests
that the first priority is to establish an environment  to facilitate new firm entry and to create the  legal
and  enforcement  frameworks  for  penalizing  anti-competitive  behavior  by  incumbents.  The
competitive  restructuring  of large state enterprises  is a resource-intensive  activity and should proceed
only on a very selective, case-by-case basis and where there is a compelling "public interest" to do so.
The  successful  restructuring  of  the  competitive  environment  and  the  effective
implementation  of  a transparent  legal systemn,  however, will face many obstacles.  As in the case of
price liberalization,  political economy  dynarmics  will surely affect the  rapidity and  completeness  of
implementation  of competition  policy reforms.  Clearly the political clout  of  government  leaders is
key to overcome  the pressure toward the staus quo of special interests and state capture.  By the same
token, a critical determinant  of success of competition  policy reform  are the  initial conditions  in the
country.  Economnies with large-scale one-company  towns  and/or  a large military industrial complex
enterprises  face special challenges of  designing policies  that promote  competition  but  at the  same
time preserve  social stability or promote  defense conversion  to civilian technologies  if commercially
viable.
3.  REFORM  OF INFRASTRUCTURE  MONOPOLIES
At  the  beginning  of  the  transition  process,  it was  clear  that  the  existing  infrastructure
networks,  created under  the  regime of  central planning,  needed extensive restructuring  to  meet the
11  The  case  of Ukraine  is  telling  on the importance  of streanlined  business  rules  to reduce  incentives  for corruption.  This
country  has repeatedly  promoted  the fight  against  corruption.  At the same  time,  economic  regulations  continue  to emerge
fostering  illicit  behavior.  Recently,  for exarnple,  a provincial  government  introduced  a decree  that any firm selling  goods
within  its 14  counties  must  have  a special  trading  pemiit  for  such intra-province  transactions  (Kaufrann,  1997)
6demands  and standards  of a market  economy  system. Demand  for these  services  had been  greatly
distorted  both by artificially  low prices  that bore little  relation  to cost and by cross-subsidies.  In
addition, most transition economies inherited state owned large-scale  utilities-including  but not
limited to electric power, gas, oil, telecom,  and  transport-where  there is effectively little separation
between  government  and  business.  The  distortions  in prices  and  output,  the  heavy  influence  of
government  on  what  should  have  been  exclusively  commercial  decisions,  the  concentration  of
ownership, and the  decay of the physical networks,  all have worked to create an environment  ripe for
corruption,  rnanifested  though  the  ways rates  are set; the  awarding  of  franchise  agreements;  scope
and quality of service offerings; barter and non-payments;  and disposition  of profits.
In  most  countries worldwide,  due to changes  in rnarkets  and technology,  many  (but not  all)
previously  "natural"  monopolies  are  no  longer  so,  and  the  socially optimal  industrial  structure  is
increasingly competitive,  with unbundled  service offerings  and  open  entry  and  exit.12 In  transition
economies,  there is wide variation in the recognition  that the  market and technological  fundarnentals
of  infrastructure  services have  changed.  In  Table 4 we present  a composite  index-"Infrastructure
Rating"-that  synthesizes the  extent  of  the infrastructure  restructuring  process  that has  taken place
in  most  of  these  countries.  The  table  also  contains  measures  that  describe  the  amount  of
restructuring  in individual infrastructure  monopoly  sectors.
Uzbekistan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  for  example,  appear  to  have  made  very  little  progress  in
dismantling  the  old  monolithic  structures  and  in promoting  commercialization  and  private  sector
involvement  in infrastructure  monopolies.13  On  the  other  side  of the  spectrum,  Estonia,  Hungary
and  Poland  have  greatly liberalized  the  provision  of  these  services  and  have  strongly  encouraged
regulatory reform and institutional  development.
Our  experience indicates that in utility markets where  "natural"  monopoly  conditions  do not
or  no longer exist, to reduce the  potential incentives for corruption  it is clear that  a priority is to de-
monopolize  and  privatize  the  existing  networks  and  introduce  comnpetitive forces.  In  remaining
utility markets, where underlying technologies give rise to large economies  of scale and scope relative
to market demand and thus natural monopoly  (or natural oligopoly) conditions  prevail, it is essential
to establish an independent,  transparent  and publicly accountable  regulatory oversight  regime.
Of  course,  effective  refonnation  and  restructuring  of  the  infrastructure  monopoly  sectors
present  a  fundamental  political  economy  challenge  for  transition  economy  governments.  These
monopolies  are typically bottleneck  facilities with huge financial and natural resource  endowments  at
their disposal, usually comprising  nation-wide networks.  They are often run by the  most  powerful  of
entrenched  interests  and  can  effectively oppose  competitive  pressure  and  arms-length  oversight.
Untangling  the  web  of  barter,  offsets  and  non-payments  between  government  agencies-the
consumers-and  utilities-their  suppliers-makes  this reform  challenge even more difficult.'4
The  impact  of  increased  commnercialization and  competition  in  infrastructure  monopoly
sectors on the  extent  of corruption  in transition  economies  has been profound,  as the  positive trend
in Figure 7 highlights.15 The data  suggest that  where  incentives  for  corruption  have been  reduced
12 There  are  excepted  segments  where  infrastructure  markets  cannot  support  the competitive  provision  of service,  e.g.,  local
distribution  of natural  gas,  water,  sewage.
13 For  an assessment  of regulatory  refonm  in  Uzbekistan  see  Broadman  (2000).
4 For an analysis  of barter,  demonetization  and  non-payments  in Russia,  see  Hendley,  Ickes,  and  Ryterman  (1999).
15  Lower  values  of the  index  of corruption  indicate  a wider  diffusion  of this phenomenon
7through  divestiture  or de-monopolization  of incumbent  infrastructure  monopolies  and  providing  for
competitive entry, the severity of corruption is much smaller-for  example, Poland  and Hungry.
Similarly, success  in reducing  the  extent  of  corruption  has  been  achieved where  stringent
rules  against barter  and  non-payments  have  been  enforced,  as  has  been  the  case  in  Estonia  and
Lithuania  (see Figures 1 and 2).  In these countries the tolerance toward arrears, both tax arrears and
payrnent arrears to state-owned  utilities, is very low, although direct subsidies have not been removed
completely  (Table 3).  This  policy choice - to use  direct rather  than  implicit subsidies to  support
firms' restructuring activities - reflects  the intention  of these governments  to create more transparent
market-based  incentives  for  infrastructure  monopolies,  and  this  has  translated  into  a  less con-upt
business  environrment.
The establishment  of innt  regulatory agencies-both  at the central and  (most critically)
at the local level, where regulatory  capture is most  pronounced  is key.  Where such institutions  have
been  created  to  operate  with  transparency  (public  hearings),  simplicity  (well-defined  rules-based
principles),  and  accountability  (election  of  regulators  or  term  limitations), the  payoffs  in terms  of
reduced  comuption have been  great.  The indices reported  in Tables 2 and  4 describe  the  progress
made  by different  countries  in designing and  implementing  effective legal and  regulatory  systems.
Countries like Russia and  Uzbekistan,  where there is nascent  implementation  of effective regulatory
regimes  incorporating  strong  independent  regulators  at  the  local levels, have  shown  to  be  fertile
environments  for rent-seeking behavior and corruption.
As the  above evidence and  discussion highlight, policy sequencing  is a fundamental  factor
for the success of these reforms.  In particular, the establishment  of independent  regulatory agencies
and  the enactment  of legal frameworks  are first order  priorities.  Indeed,  privatization of incumbent
utilities should proceed cautiously-if  at all-undl  an effective regulatory regime has been established
as well as the  enabling environment  for  new entrants  has  been created.  Privatizing utilities in the
presence  of  insufficiently  functioning  market  institutions  will  otherwise  aggravate  the  existing
problem  by transforming  a gqzem'mnt  monopoly  into a pnite  monopoly,  yet with weak checks and
balances.16
However, getting the  sequencing  "right"  is only a necessary and  not  a  sufficient condition
for success in combating  corruption  in reform  of  infrastructure  monopoly  sectors: strong  political
will at the  highest levels of govemment  and in the legislature, as well as a judiciary willing to take on
entrenched  interests  must  also  materialize.  In  addition,  the  newly established  regulatory  agencies
must be committed to maintain independent  rate-setting and other judgements  in the face of political
pressures  and  changes.  Last,  but  not  least,  a key  factor  for  the  success  in  the  restructuring  of
infrastructure  monopolies is the existence of effectively trained staff in these agencies, since often the
number  of staff in the infrastructure  monopolies will outweigh those charged with enforcement.
4.  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE
When  corporate  governance  structures  and  incentives  - the  rules  and  institutons  that
determine  the  extent  to which  managers  act in the  best  interest  of  shareholders  - are weak,  the
incentives for  opportunistic  behavior  and  corruption  are  often  strong.  This  is especially true  for
firms with significant (or even  complete)  state ownership  (SOEs)-a  common  feature of transition
economies-where  there is often  litde  effective separation  between  government  and  business:  in
16 A good example is the case of the Russian natural  gas producer  Gazprom.
8such  firrs, fundamental  conflicts-of-interest  are more  likely  to arise  because  of the tension  between
the decisions  of managers,  who  are  appointed  by the government  and thus naturally  more  inclined  to
protect  workers  and delay  the restructuring  process,  and  the interests  of shareholders.
This  conflict  of interests  and objectives  between  shareholders  and managers  is also present
in privately  held  firms  where  there is widely  dispersed  ownership  and thus separation  of ownership
and control.17  Wlth control delegated  to professional  managers,  owners  face a principal-agent
problemn  where  there are weak  checks  and balances,  such as ineffectual  boards  of directors  or lack
of independent  financial  audits,  the shareholders  (principals)  cannot  be assured  that their interests  are
fully  protected  from  those of the managers  (agents).  Conversely,  in the case  where  share  ownership
is closely  held  with  the  main  shareholder  playing  an active  role  in management  ("insider  control")  but
there  are weak  internal  and external  disciplines  on corporate  performance,  such as a banking  system
that does  not engender  strong  creditors'  rights  or require  scrupulous  payment  of credit,  deleterious
outcomes  and economic  distortions  can arise: unchecked  insider  control  can  lead  to asset  stripping,
de-capitalization  and corruption,  seriously  hampering  the restructuring  process. This can also create
powerful  interest  groups  against  corporate  governance  reforms. This is the case in Russia,  among
other  transition  econornies.1 8
Thus,  both in the case  of SOEs and privately  held  firms,  an effective  and sound  corporate
governance  structure  is key in anticipating  and resolving  potential  conflicts  of interests  between
managers  and shareholders  and reducing  incentives  for rent-seeking  behavior  and corruption.
For most transition  economies,  establishing  effective  corporate  governance  incentives  and
institutions  is a medium-term  challenge,  intertwined  with  the establishment  of a competitive  business
environrnent. Responding  to this challenge  necessitates  implementation  of a multi-prong  set of
measures.  It requires  building  a transparent  and sound  legal  framework,  such  as a company  law  and a
bankruptcy  law,  it demands  establishing  a tradition  of adherence  to ethical  standards;  and it involves
creating  a system  of checks  and balances  that engenders  compliance  to rules transparency  and
accountability.  In addition,  the political  economy  problems  of implementing  and achieving  corporate
governance  reform  in SOEs-especially  where systemic,  widespread  privatization  is not politically
accepted-are often appreciable;  resorting  to hybrid measures  can result in new, unanticipated
contradictions  as  the Chinese  and Uzbekistan  experiences  suggest. 1 9
There  is a wide array of corporate  govemance  reforms  that have proven effective in curbing
both incentives  and opportunities for corruption, as evidenced  by the recent experience  of transition.
They include:
(i) the introduction of a company law that provides for effective boards of directors and
share ownership  disclosure  requirements, including  those pertaining  to cross-holdings,  so to increase
transparency,
17 See La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silane  F. and Shleifer A. (1998).
18 See Broadmnan  (1999a)  and Radygin (1999).
19 The Chinese approach to corporate governance reforms in SOlEs  has centered on creation of "state asset management
companies" as well as use of  a  "dual-track" mechanism whereby traditional state-owned enterprises co-exist with
collectively  owned firns  and an emerging private sector, see World Bank (1997) and Broadman (1996) and (1999b). In
Uzbekistan, the focus has been on creation of  state "associations", which are the old sector ministries; see Broadman
(2000).
9(ii) the establishment  of strong penalties  for insider  trading and pyramid  schemes,  and
management  disqualification  penalties  (criminal  in some cases)  for gross abrogation  of corporate
'articles  of association',  dereliction  of duty, fraud or misrepresentation;
(iii) the appointment  of  'outsiders' (non-managers)  to  boards of  directors, non-state
representatives  on SOE boards and independent  professionals  managing  state shares (reduced  to
passive  minority  status),  as  well  as the introduction  of staggered  elections  for boards  of directors;
(iv) the establishment  of an effective  legal  framework  for the exercise  of creditors'  rights  -
including  and especiallv  those of banks-through  use of in-court and out-of-court  bankruptcy
procedures;
(v)  the introduction  of regular,  published  independent  audits  of financial  accounts  based  on
standardized  rules  (IAS);
(vi)  the creation  of an effective  policy  framework  that provides  for the (credible  threat of)
competitive  mergers  and acquisitions  in order  to bring  about  a "market  for corporate  control".
(vii)  the systematic  use of professional  "watchdog"  agencies  and reputational  agents  (credit
rating  agencies);  and
(vii) the strong  enforcement  of ethical  standards  and conflict-of-interest  laws  especially  as
applicable  to public  officials.
An example  of the empirical  evidence  on the linkage  between  the above-mentioned  reforms
and reduced  incentives  for corruption  is portrayed  in Figure  9. As previously  indicated  (Table  3),  the
design  and the introduction  of effective  bankruptcy  (insolvency  regimes  has been achieved  in a
relatively  few  transition  countries,  such as Croatia  and Estonia. Figure  9 shows  that such countries
experience  low  levels  of corruption. 20 Most  of the surveyed  transition  economies,  however,  receive
a medium  score: while  their bankruptcy  regimes  are  broadly  adequate,  they  are  in need of revisions
and clarification.  More  importantly,  the bankruptcy  laws  are not perceived  as effectively  enforced,
mostly  because  of limited  court capacity  and lack  of properly  trained  personnel;  Russia  is a case  in
t.21 In such  cases,  the level  of corruption  can be appreciable.  At one end of the spectrum  there
are countries,  such as Ukraine  and Georgia,  which are perceived  as having  ineffectual  bankruptcy
legislation  and which  score very  high in terms  of corruption. The case  of Georgia  is especially  of
interest as it highlights  the importance  of removing  obstacles  to the ilz  aion  of laws. The
Bankruptcy  Law  Index has declined  for this country  over the past two years.n2  Though Georgia's
insolvency  law was  introduced  in 1997  and cases  have  been  processed,  very  few of these  cases  have
been  resolved,  signaling  weak  effectiveness.  Thus it is not surprising  that all  other  things  equal,  there
is a  strong  association  between  Georgia's  relatively weak  bankruptcy  framework  and  its  relatively
high CPI  score.
Another prominent example  that corroborates  the importance  of the aforementioned
corporate  governance  reforms  in curtailing  corruption  is the case  of Russia's  financial  and industrial
groups  (FIGs). Some  of the core  features  of these  banking-industrial  holdings  engender  conflicts  of
20 M  surprisingly,  Kyrgyzstan  and Macedonia  have  received  high  marks  for their  insolvency  laws  (introduced  in 1994  and
1998,  respectively)  and their implementation. This reflects the government  efforts to improve the investment climate.
21 T  he case  of Russia  deserves  a separate  discussion.  A new  bankruptcy  law-greatly  improved  with  respect  the previous
one-came into  effect  in March  1998.  I lowever,  its implementation  has  been  hampered  by the lack  of trained  judicial  staff
and legal  infrastructures.  See  Mirsky  (1999).
22 For an overview  discussion  of the development  of bankruptcy  laws  and regulations  in transition  economies,  see  EBRD
(1999).
10interest,  and thus facilitate  rent-seeking  behavior  and corruption. The  composition  of the boards  of
directors  of most of these  groups,  for example,  are built  less on principles  of market-based  checks
and balance  and meritocracy,  and more  on a system  of personal  affiliation  and cadreship.  There is
extensive  cross ownership  of  shares across FIGs, creating a  complex web of  inter-locking
directorates  with  unclear  lines  of authority.  In addition,  these  groups  have  established  a system  for
the provision  and allocation  of internally-provided  credit  to control  the activities  of members,  rather
than rely  on other (extemal)  sources  of credit that would serve an important  due diligence  and
financial  control function. It  is also fairly common practice for FIGs to  have access  to  the
management  of state  shareholdings  through  trust management  arrangements.23
To guarantee  the sustained  realization  of corporate  govemance  reforms, such initiatives
must be paired with the introduction  of a transparent and market-based  regime  for price and
production  setting,  and one that engenders  the play  of competitive  forces. Whle different  transition
countries  have  utilized  corporate  govemance  frameworks  rooted in different  legal  traditions,  giving
nse to different  "models"  of corporate  governance  (Anglo;  Germnanic;  Japanese;  etc), the most of
effective  regimes  are  those that are  based  on commercial  (or market-based)  principles,  with  clear  lines
of authority,  effective  checks  and balances  and  transparent  accountability.
5.  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  AND  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT
POLICIES
The reduction  of protectionist  measures  and the adherence  to internationally  accepted  rules
for international  trade and foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  provide  for critical  external  discipline  on
firm  behavior  as well  as that of public  officials.  This in turn reduces  the incentives  for corruption.
For example,  the pressure of international  competition  posed by imports engenders  a healthy
challenge  to domestic  firms  to operate  more  efficiently.  FDI is a potent tool for new entry: it not
only creates  powerful  incentives  for incumbent  firms with market  power  to reduce  prices  to costs
and improve  product  quality,  but also engenders  the transfer  of advances  in entrepreneurial  talent
and managerial  skills.
Vested  interests  that have  enjoyed  trade protection  and been  able  to capture  rents often  are
politically  powerful  and possess  an effective  lobbying  base, and thus resistant  to trade and FDI
reform. Wide  variations  in tariff  schedules,  an intricate  systems  for quotas,  and the existence  of tax
or  other special concessions  for  FDI  are breeding grounds for rent-seeking  behavior and
con-uption. 24
The experience  of many  transition  economies  provides  us with a list of measures,  whose
implementation  is effective  in reducing  incentives  for corruption. Consider  for example  the tariff
structure.  Whenever  tariffs differ greatly  across goods, the difference  between them creates
increased  opportunities  for customs officials  to exercise  discretion  and to  extracts rents from
importers:  officials  may  offer (or  threaten)  to misclassify  goods  in exchange  of bribes. Thus,  greater
uriformity  of tariff  structures  cuts down  the incentives  for corruption.  Similar  reasoning  applies  to
duty exemptions  or quotas;  their existence  invites  opportunistic  behavior  by custom  officials  and
23 See  Perrotti  and  Gelfer  (1998)  and  Radygin  (1999).
24 Gatti (1999) analyzes  the link between corruption and trade tariffs, providing evidence  that corruption is stronger the
more diversified  trade tariffs are.  Tarr (1999)  examines  the case for tariff unifomnityin Russia. Bergsman,  Broadman and
Drebentsov (1999)  analyzc Russia's  FDI regime.
11often creates pressure  to protect  the  special interests  of a few producers.  Their elimination-or  the
transformation  of quotas into tariffs-can  reduce the possibility of rent-seeking  behavior.
As  for FDI,  tax, duty and  other  concessions,  including  the  creation  of  "special economic
zones"  or "priority investment  programs"  often are recipes for discretionary behavior  by government
officials and thus corruption.  Moreover  these  measures generally do  not engender more  investment
activity than  what  otherwise  would  take  place  and  on  net  give rise  to  sizeable  fiscal drains  and
therefore  do  not constitute  sound  policy.  Dismantling  them-or  refraining  from  establishing  them
in the first place-is  desirable.  Similarly, the simplification of FDI  "negative  lists", which  stipulate a
country's  sectors  where  FDI  is either  prohibited  or  limited, greatly reduces  discretion  and  in turn
opportunities  for corruption.
More generally, the most  effective reformrs of FDI  policy regimes have included  steps  to  (i)
grant  non-discrinminatory, "national  treatment"  to foreign  investors  for both  right of  establishment
and post-establishment  operations;  (ii) prohibit the  imposition  of new, and the phase out of existing,
trade-related  investment  measures  (TRIMs),  e.g.,  local  content  measures,  export  performnance
requirements,  restrictions  on  use of  foreign exchange and trade  balancing requirements;  (iii) provide
freedom  to  foreign direct investment  projects  regarding  all investment-related  transfers,  e.g., profits
and  royalties; (iv) provide  for  binding  international  arbitration  for  investor-State  disputes;  and  (v)
abide by international  law standards  for expropriation,  i.e., expropriation  only for  a public purpose
and with prompt,  adequate and effective compensation.
Membership  in the  rules-based WTO  can provide  countries  with perhaps  the  most  potent
set  of institutional  checks  and  balances  in the  international  economic  sphere  and  thus  substantially
reduce  discretionary  behavior  and  corruption  with  regard to  international  trade  and  foreign  direct
investment policies.
Table 2 provides  a sunmnary of the progress  made in the  areas of trade and  FDI  reform  by
most  transition  economies.  Consider  for  example  the  cases  of  Uzbekistan  and  Russia.  Both
countnes  still have widespread import and export controls  and limited access to foreign exchange.  In
addition,  their  tariff  structures  are  quite  complicated  and  not  uniform.  These  elements  have
facilitated the emergence  of corruption,  as the CPI scores for these countries indicate (see Figure 10).
In contrast, the countries  in Central Europe  and the Baltic region have liberalized trade  and access to
foreign exchange very early on in the transition  process,  and subsequently  they  have become  (or are
in the  process  of  becoming)  members  of the  WTO.  Both  the  Czech  Republic  and  Hungary,  for
example,  became  WTO  members  in  January  1995,  after  having  removed  most  of  their  trade
distortions  between  1991 and  1993.  Lithuania  and Estonia  are committed  to  fulfill WTO  accession
obligations  and become  members  in the  near future.  These political choices  and the  commitment  to
sustain them have reduced  incentives for corruption.  25
In  between these two  extremes are countries  such  as Bulgaria and Romania  and most  of the
OIS, which  have implemented  more uneven  and  gradual trade liberalization  policies, creating  greater
incentives  for  corruption  (see  Figure  10).  Most  of  these  countries  introduced  early  on  in  the
transition the  aforementioned  trade reforms.  However, many of these governments  were not able to
sustain fully these reforms  and some partially reversed them  a few years later.  The lack of clarity in
government  policies and the  non-transparent  business environment  that  has ensued have worked  to
25 The  case  of Kyrgyzstan,  which  has become  a WTO  member  in 1998,  highlights  once  more  how dear regulations  must  be
paired  with  an effective  implementation  to reduce  corruption. The Trade System  Index in fact is very high (4), as a
reflection  of the transparent  system  of custom  tariffs  introduced  and  its openness  to intemational  trade. Its implementation
has however  been  slowed  by the lack  of a functioning  administration.  This  has resulted  in widespread  corruption  among
custom  officials.
12linit  inflows  of FDI and have perpetrated inefficient  behavior of domestic firms.  This in turn has
encouraged  corruption.
Overall,  to discourage  rent-seeking  and illicit behavior  it is clearly  beneficial  to (i) phase out
import and export restrictions,  (ii) create a simpler and more uniform tariff system, and (iii)  establish
a transparent FDI policy regime. At the same time, (iv) the appropriate administrative  institutions
need to be created to effectively  enforce these new policy  frameworks. It is evident that to succeed
in liberalizing  the trade and FDI regimes  governments need to be able and willing  to hold in check
pre-existing,  powerful  vested interests. Of course these reformns  can come with sizeable social  costs
attached  to them in the short-run, especially  in terms of employment  re-allocation  or job losses. It is
therefore important for governments  to provide trade remedy measures to ease the transition costs
that arise  from intemational  competition.
6.  TESTING  FOR  CAUSALITY:  SOME  INITIAL  RESULTS
We argued in the previous sections that lack of development of basic market institutions
creates a fertile ground for discretionary  behavior  and corruption. In particular, we emphasized  that
certain  elements of a  fully functioning  market  system-atomistic  pricing  and an  absence of implicit
and  explicit subsides; robust  competition among incumbents and  open  entry for  new  rivals;
independent regulatory regimes governing markets where natural monopoly (or natural oligopoly)
mnarket  structures prevail; market-based corporate govemance incentives and protection of well-
defined  shareholder  rights; and  openness  to  international  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment-all
help to reduce the incentives  for corruption.
The basic  data plots that we have presented (Figures  1-10)  to support our arguments  can be
summarized  through  bivariate correlations  between  indices of  institutional  development  and  indices
of corruption.  Table 6 presents  these  bivariate correlations.26 As indicated  in the  table's  first row,
there  are statistically significant  simple correlations  between  corruption  and  the  institutional  indices
in virtually all cases; the  exception  is that  the  correlation  between  the  soft  budget  constraint  index
and the corruption  index is significant only at the  10 percent level.
But  can we say something  more  about  causality and  the relative contribution  of each  factor
in explaining corruption?  We have begun to explore systematically this question  through  multivariate
statistical analysis using the  indices discussed  in the  previous  sections.  The existing, small literature
on  the  determinants  of  corruption  in dezdqai and  ezdqping  economies  suggests  that,  in  essence,
corruption  can  be  explained  by the  quality  of  the  government  of  a  country  (as reflected  by the
country's  level of economic  development)  and  the quality of the  country's  political institutions. 27 In
particular,  it is typically posited  that  incentives  for corruption  and  illegal activities are  likely to  be
lower in countries more economically developed  (measured by GDP  per capita) and where  there are
greater  democratic  political processes  and  a  strong  independent  press  (measured  by  an  index  of
democracy).  In  addition, it  is also usually hypothesized  that openness  to foreign trade-especially  to
competition  from imports-(measured  by imports  as percentage  of GDP)  reduces the potential rents
of  government  officials,  and,  in  turn,  decreases  incentives  for  corruption.  To  summarize,  the
literature  on the determinants  of corruption  in deuoal  and dedping economies  generally follows this
type of model:
26  lThe Graft Index is mcasured on scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to lower corrupton.  The results
reported in Tables 6 and 7 'were  calculated  using the inverse  of the Graft Index, to make the results more intuitive.
27  See Ades and Di Tella (1999),  Treisran  (1999),  and Gatti (1999).
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But in the case of trarEitin  economies, which, as we note above, are in the process of
undergoing  fwramntal  changes in  basic institutional regimes, the  empirical specification of this
model iS likely  to be inadequate. In particular,  the quality of government in transition countries is
likely  not to be fully  captured by a measure of GDP.  Arguably  more than other types of countries,
the quality  of government  in transition economies  would seem to be a direct function of the types of
basic market institutions on which we have been focusing.  Put differently, while GDP  may be a
good gross proxy for quality of government, the underlying  institutions that actually  determiine  the
quality of government  would seem to be more direct proxies. The last column in Table 6 suggests
this argument  has some merit: GDP per capita is highly  correlated with virtually  all of the individual
institutional  indicators.  Accordingly,  this argues for substituting the various institutional variables
described above for GDP per capita.
By the same token, the use of a measure  of imports as a proxy for openness to foreign  trade
is also unlikely  to be adequate. The linkages  between  trade and corruption are likely  to be affected by
activities  related to a country's exports as well as to its imports. A better measure  of these linkages  is
an indicator  capturing  the development  and the degree of openness of the overall  trade system.
Based on these considerations,  we employ a model different from that specified  in equation
1. In particular,  as summarized  in equation 2, our model employs  the following  variables:  (i) a vector
of institutional  indicators measuring infrastructure development, entry barriers, soft budgets, legal
effectiveness,  and the bankruptcy regime ("Market Institution Indices"); (ii) an index of democratic
development  ("Democratic  Reform Index");28 and  (iii) a trade system index  ("Trade System Index"):
(2)  CVptzon  =f(quztyzenv  mn, quadity  oxitical  tr  n, opo  s to trade)
= b 1 + b. (Irstitutwnl  itn'catous)  + bl (Inrrxc  of  denray)  + b4  (Trade  sjstem  in5k)
We know at the outset  that this is a difficult task because our intuition  tells us-and  Table 6
confirms-that  most  of  the  institutional  indicators  available are  correlated  with  each  other.  This
creates, of  course, potentially significant multicollinearity  problems in  the  statistical estimation
process,  thus potentially weakening the  results.  Moreover, some of the  institutional  indices are likely
to be endogenous to corruption: if it is true, for example, that a poorly functioning legal system
causes corruption,  it may also be the  case that  widespread corruption  prevents  the  improvement  of
the  legal system.  Indeed,  this  "simultaneity  problem"  reflects  precisely  the  dialectic posed  by  the
political  economy  problem  of  state  capture  that  we  have  been  emphasizing  throughout  our
discussion that  makes implementation  of corruption-curbing  reformns  so challenging.  The standard
statistical solution  for  this  problem  is the  use  of  instrumental  variables  in multivariate  regressions.
Unfortunately, we are not  able to find suitable individual "instruments"  for our  explanatory variables
at this stage, in part because of the unavailability of appropriate  data.  Thus  our  estimation results are
tainted  by the possibility of endogeneity  and  cannot provide  conclusive evidence  on the direction  of
the  causality between  development  of  market  institutions  and  incidence  of corruption.  Beanrng in
28 The Democratic Reform Index (DRI) by Freedom House International is used to capture the degree of politcal and
democratic development.  This index is the unweighted average of five separate ratings: political process, civil society,
independent media, govenmment  and public administrauon and nile of law.  It is calculated on a one-to-seven scale, with
one representing  the highest  and seven the lowest level of progress.
14mind  these  considerations,  we have  focused  our initial  efforts  on running  a series  of OLS  regressions,
attempting  to control  for as  many  factors  as possible  that may  affect  corruption.
The  first column  of Table  7 describes  the results  of our OLS  estimation29  using  the Market
Institution  Indices  as explanatory  variables,  and the Democratic  Reform  Index and Trade System
Index as control  variables  for the twenty-six  transition  economies  under examination.30  The results
are  somewhat  striking:  despite  the limited  number  of observations  and the relative  large  number  of
parameters  we try to estirnate,  the coefficients  on three of the Market Institution Indices are
statistically  significant;  the remaining  two have the correct sign, although  they are not statistically
significant  (see  below). The model  explains  almost  94 percent  of the variation  in corruption  across
the sample.  The results  suggest  the following:  The greater  the barriers  to entry, the greater  the
incentives  for illegal  behavior  and  corruption.  The more  effective  a legal  system  a country  possesses,
the lower  the corruption  observed.  The more competitive  the infrastructure  services,  the lower  the
incidence  of corruption.  31  As for the control  variables,  our  model  confirmrs  the results  of others  that
democratic  reforms  are indeed  important  checks  on corruption;  while  the coefficient  on the trade
system  index  has  the correct  sign,  but it is not statistically  significant.
How can we  explain  the poor performance  of two of the Market  Institutions  Indices?  First,
there  is likely  to be strong  multicollinearity  among  the explanatory  variables,  as can  be clearly  seen  in
Table  6. In particular,  the Bankruptcy  Law  Index is highly  correlated  with both the Index of Legal
Effectiveness  and the Trade System  Index, conceivably  reducing  the former's  explanatory  power.
Second,  the Soft  Budget  Constraint  Index  and the Trade  System  Index  are also  highly  correlated  with
each  other. In addition,  and perhaps  more  important  in explaining  why  there  is poor performance  of
the Soft Budget  Constraint  Index, is that it, itself,  exhibits  a weak bi-variate  correlation  with the
measures  of corruption,  as indicated  in Table 6.  This presents an obvious  challenge  for future
research-to identify the appropriate  instrumental  variables  so to resolve  these multicollinearity
issues.32
There  is still  the issue as to whether  these Market  Institution  Indices  are capturing  more
effectively  the quality  of government  than would  GDP per capita;  put differently,  is the exclusion  of
GDP per capita  reducing  the explanatory  power  of our model? To assess  this concem we included
GDP per capita  as explanatory  variable  in our regression.  The results  are described  in the second
column  of Table  7. The results  show  that while  the same  three  coefficients  on the Market  Institution
Indices  are still  statistically  significant,  their explanatory  power  has decreased  because  of the strong
correlation  existing  between  these  variables  and the GDP variable.  In addition,  the coefficient  on
GDP per capita  is not statistically  significant.  The overall  explanatory  power  of the model  also  is not
measurably  enhanced. Thus, the introduction  of GDP per capita  does not improve  our model's
explanatory  power.
29  The  robustness  of  our  results  is  confirmed  by  nmning  the  same  regressions  using  both  measures  of  corruption:  the  CPI
and  the  Graft  index.  Also  the  results  reported  use  the  inverse  of  the  Graft  Index,  to  make  the  results  more  intuitive.
30  This set of countries includes  Eastem Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Vietnam, China and Mongolia  are however
excluded  because of insufficient  data.
31  These results are robust to the use of the variable Subsidies  or the Index of Barriers to Exit instead of the Soft Budget
Constraint Index.
32  Researchers  have suggested  few alternative  instruments  to  address  this  issue - namely, the  origin of  the legal  system and
the latitudinal  distance from the equator. The use of these vanrables  however is more difficult to justify  in the context  of
transition  economies  than  of developing countnes.
15CONCLUSIONS
In recent years the fight against corruption has become a key element in the policy agenda
for  governments of transition economies, where this phenomenon threatens the  overall reform
process.  Although extensive evidence on the links between corruption and economic growth has
been collected,  the causes and origins  of corruption are still  not fully  understood, with few empirical
studies on the nature and extent of the determinants  of corruption available.  Despite data limitations
and the challenge  of calibrating  with precision  the complex relationships among the determinants of
corruption, our empirical  exercise  gives some support to our intuition that a well-established  market
system characterized  by clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances, and a
healthy competitive environment reduces rent-seeking  opportunities and, in turn, the incentives for
corruption. In particular,  our investigation  suggests  that entry barriers, an effective  legal system and
well-developed  and competitive infrastructure service providers play especially  important roles in
curbing corruption.
(learly, the endogeneity  between corruption and the progress of the reform process itself
requires further empirical  work and caution in the interpretation of our results. However, the policy
implications  that can derived  from this initial  exploration  are unmistakable  and highly  relevant for the
success of the reform process in transition economies. To reduce the incentives  for illegal  behavior
and  corruption,  policy  makers  need  to  give  utmost  attention  to  the  design  and  effective
implementation  of economic reforms that foster the development  of basic  mnarket  institutions.
A final observation. An item missing  from the institutional  issues  on which we have focused
is banking and financial  sector reform.  The lack of a sound, competitive and transparent financial
system creates fertile ground for soft budget constraints and arrears and increases the intensity of
barriers to  entry and  exit of real sector enterprises, which in  turn  leads to  more  rent-seeking
opportunities and  incentives for  corruption.  A  more  systematic analysis of the  link  between
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CPI  = Corruption  Perception  Index,  Transparency  International,  1999;  range:  10,  0 (highlh  corrupted)
Graft  Index  = Kaufmann,  Daniel,  Aart  Kraay  and Pablo  Zoido-Lobaton  (1999a). "Governance  Mattcrs".
Kaufmann,  Daniel,  Aart  Kraay  and  Pablo  Zoido-Lobaton  (1999b).  "Aggregating  (Governance  Indicators"
Graft  is  measured  on a scale  of about  -2.5 to 2.5, with  higher  values  corresponding  to lower  corruption.Table 2
Trade and Competition  Legal Environment
(1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)
Albania  4  2  n.a.  n.a  2  1.7
Azerbaijan  3.3  1  2.79  5.7  3.3  2
Bosnia  and  Herz  2.7  n.a.  n.a  2  1
Croatia  4  2  2.66  n.a  4  2.7
Czech  Repub lc  0  .0  04.3  0 000;4J3  2.78  43.1  3.3  27
Istonia  4  2.7  2.18  3  3.3  3.7
Miltdonia,  Form  4  17  "'a  31  3,7
(:corgia  4  2  2.89  4.5  2  2
fHungay  000;00  t:  :03000430000  i  0  0.  03=;4.3  3  2,45  2.8  4  3.7
Kazakhstan  3  2  2.84  4.6  3.3  3.3
Kyr&  Rpublic  4  2  3.36  43  i334  3
l.atvia  4.3  2.7  n.a,  n.a.  3.7  3
Lithuania  4  2.3  nRa.  n*a.  4  3
Moldova  4  2  3.26  4.4  3.7  3
P1100  aiaud  000  0  ;  S  ::V4,3  0  g  003;0  0  2.S0  :  3.73-  3  3
Romania  4  2  3,1  3.9  3.3  3.7
Russia  2.3  2.3  2,8  5.4a  3.  2,3,
Slovak  Republic  4.3  3  2.77  na.  3.3  3
SlovCenia  4.3  2  2436  .4.  .4  ,.  4
Tajikistan  2.7  1  n.a.  n.a.  na  n.a.
Tud~'rneaistan  If:  00001  t0  12  ,:  '  :;  - n.e.S;f0CAt00nXa-;  \n.a.  1UL  000:t  3.0.00 
IJkraine  3  2  3.02  5.7  2  2
UZjekistan  1  2  . 20.9  . 4,6  2  2.3
Sources:
EBRI), Transition Report,  1999
* Intensity  of entry barriers is a composite of the six main barriers to entry and expansion as perceived by start-ups (higher value = higher barriers).
** Intensity  of exit barriers  is a soft budget index  composed of subsidies and barter components  (itigher value = higher barriers)Table 3
Liberalization  and Competition
~~~~~~~~~~~~~Q.  ....  - 5E t  .- '' 
(1998)  (1998)  in CPI (97)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)
Albania  3  na.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  I
Armatia  3  1.77  7  ^  39  .4  .- I
Azerbaijan  3  1.53  6  62  15.5  19  3.3
.. u.  1.57  . _1  7  7  ..  ..........  ...  i  ..  ......  14 
Bosnia and Herz  3  n,a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Bula  3.  1s38  - 14.4 °9.  --  :1  I  3.7
Croatia  3  1.43  38  14.5  22  3.7
czech  :~pu  3  .;  1;59  ;  :  -133  : 7 :  - 14;  ...  3 4
Estonia  3  1.95  24  9  11  3  3.7
MaP  .doti,  3  -a  196,  n  .. a--.  _4  I-. -
Georgia  3  1.27  8.3  62  6  29  1.7
Hiing~~~~~~~y 32  ~~~~~1,98  13.  43  4  3.7
Kazakhstan  3  1.27  n.a.  28  7.5  18  3
Latvia  3  n.a.  19.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  33
Ll1jinf  3  - .1+:  :-..  . nA-.e-.  - 13  : -2. -. ,.
Moldova  3  0.82  n.a.  41  14.5  24  3
POIland  -~3  4 
Romania  3  1.07  7  28  65  4  3
Slovak Republic  3  1.65  14.9  40  14.5  12.5  3
.... l.--  . e....  3  ISS-  . . .2.24  >  _  .x  3..~..  d  .... i  -
Tajikistan  3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  na.  n.a.
Ukraine  3  1.24  n.a.  32  4  21  2
Uzb~kjsan  -2  183  :  I¢  '..;Yr  :it  . -
Sources:
EBRD, Transition Report, 1999
* proportion  of firms  in a country  that failed  to pay  all their  taxes.  Higher  index  value  = softer  budget  contraints
**  percentage  of firms  that report  receiving  state subsidies.
*** percentagc  of firms  that say  they  had substantial  arrears  with  the national  or local  government,  or with  state-owned  utilities  companiesTable 4
Infrastructure  Monopolies
Rating (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)  (1998)
Albania  1.8  1.3  2  2  2  1.3 A  ea0  00  0  ^  -v2.}  X  t  rEg  01  S  Wi3  3  0 ^  2  ' M  'igj  2
Azerbaijan  18  13  2  2  13  2
4~  MI  2s  "L  [1Y  '221 
Bosniaand  Herz  n.a.  1.3  2  2  n.a.
Croatia  2.3  2.3  23  2.3  23  3.3
qz00--^  1 iep  bfl  2.8  4  "  '  b  3  )4  "  '^6'<  0  Estonia  3.3  4  3  4  n.a.  4
Georgia  24  2  3  3  2  n.a.
n,00003,8  .. j.j  3.;  .....  3.3.  . .4
Kazakhstan  2.4  2.3  3.3  2  2  1.3 Kyr~z Republck00  0 00 >  ^>  1.9  ^  ;=-000-  ;  >  ai<;  2  .. ^  ; j  0  1.33 
Latvia  2.9  3  3  33  2.3  3 i-  . i  a . ...  . 26  -.  '3  .2  .. 0^  . =  2  ';.  .. 2'...  '  33 Moldova  2.2  2.3  3  2  2  2
;  ~f~..32  . A  033007_<0  3  33  L  <  \  .0Y'3i  3  4 Romania  3.1  3  3  4  2.3  3
Slovak Republic  21  23  2  2  2.3  n.a.
Tajikistan  1.1  13  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Turkmenist0ii  .|."'  U  >  1  0  ' ;''  3  1  '.  j  '^  130  .'-  I  U  ..  1 Ukraine  2  2.3  2.3  1.3  1.3  1.3
Uibe  0000is  t00.  . 01.7.,  00..iw2-:0i  g  ^1  ..  2W  j' Sources:
FBRI),  Transition  Report.  1999Table 5
Economic Development and Political Reform Indicators
G1~~~~?  pr  Siia  ........  *t  mr#D'  ~~.  nt
;  11  O  t  .;:  v t  . ...  ..  ...... = 
US dollars*  1996*  1997**  1997**  1997***  1997***
Albania  816.7  21.4  35.6  4.69  4.5  4.75
An,,,ia  ,,  426  ,  39  58.3  43X-  . . . . 5,2S
Azerbaijan  423  33 5  53  5.38  5.5  5.5
TOsn iaand llerz  669  n.a.  n.a.  6.19  6  6.25 Bulgia  -1170v4.'  i  '  . ,  '  4".8  _-~54  3  213.,I  ,,  4L'.5.
Croatia  4422  32.1  97.6  4.31  4.25  4.75
Czeh Republic  :  5.  :425  :-  3,j  3  ;5  1.2$
Fstonia  2981  53.3  89.6  2  1.75  1.75
Macedonia,  iForm  r  1971  .1  5^  3,9  ..  4
Georgia  845  14.1  n.a.  4.44  4.5  4.25
1Jvngaly  4441  34-3  --  . 4  . x4  f.2.  .5
Kazakhstan  1274  31.1  37.5  5.31  5.5  5.5
Kyrgz,Republic  . 394.3  36.2  463  . ,4.7  - . -
l.atv'ia  2071  36.7  59.5  2.06  2  1.75
Lithuamia  2127  48,9  6L1  1'  - :+5....  1.5
Moldova  444.1  48.4  74.1  3.88  3.5  4.25
Poland  3486  . ',,  ,  ,  ,  . ,  ,,3  1..2  '..
Romania  1571  26.2  36.7  3.81  3.25  4
Russia  .2910  183  . 20.8  ...  . . ,,.  . 4.325
Slovak Republic  3495  53.1  71  3.63  3.5  4
Slovenia  . 9439  46.7  58r4  1.1  2  1  .75 .. ..  .. . . ......  ... 7  4.  7 4.n.a.  ..
Tajikistan  174  74  na.  5.75  5.75  6
Turkmenistan  424  8.1  . '.  6.94  7  7
IJkraine  872  39.6  45.2  4.13  3.5  4.75
Uzbcldektan  -5.  &  .90  284i  30.8  . 6.5  6.5,  6.5
Sources:  * "Transition  Report,  1999", EBRD.  ** The  World Bank, 1999.
***  "Nations  in Transit",  1997  and 1998,  Freedom  House  International.  This index is the unweighted  average  of five different indeces  of political liberalization.
For  all the 26 countries  surveyed  Freedom  House  rated  political liberalization  on a  one-to-seven  scale,  with one  representing  the highest  and seven  the lowest  level  of progress.
****  "Nations  in Transit", 1998,  Freedom  House  International.
For  all the 26 countries  surveyed  Freedom  House  used  a one-to-seven  scale,  with one  representing  the highest  and seven  the lowest  level  of progress.TABLE 6  CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS  BETWEEN  CORRUPTION  AND INSTITUTIONAL  INDICATORS
Variable  GRAFTa  Trade  Infrastruc-  Entry  Soft Budget  Legal  Bankruptcy  Democratic  GDP per
System  ture Rating  Baniers  Constraint  Effective-  Law Index  Reform Index  capita
Index  ness
GRAFTa  1  0.5529)  0.7913""  -0.5191**  -0.346*  0.5603*  0.5183**  0.88696**  0.82321*F
(25)  (25)  (19)  (20)  (24)  (24)  (25)  (26)
Trade  System  1  0.6893*  -0.041  0.2199  0.4962*"  0.4734*  -0.7233**  0.3941**
Index  (25)  (19)  (20)  (24)  (24)  (25)  (26)
Infrastructure  1  -0.3699  -0.2421  0.6892**  0.5393**  -0.8641*"  0.5568**
Rating  (19)  (20)  (23)  (23)  (25)  (25)
Entry Barriers  1  0.2985  -0.1595  -0.0938  0.3482  -0.4793**
(19)  (19)  (19)  (19)  (19)
Soft Budget  1  -0.4441'F*  -0.20  0.271  -0.1185
Constraint  (20)  (20)  (20)  (20)
Legal  1  0.8545*  -0.5378'*  0.4905**
Effectiveness  (24)  (23)  (24)
Bankruptcy  1  -0.511'I  0.5208*
Law Index  (23)  (24)
Democratic  1  -0.6774**
Reform Index  (25)
GDP per Capita  1
Number of observations  in parentheses
*' significant at the 5%
'>  significant  at the 10%
a Graft is measured  on a scale  of-2  5 to 2.5 with  higher  values  corresponditng  to lower  corruption. To make the results  more  intuitive  however  we use the inverse  of
GraftTABLE  7:  THE  IMPACT  OF INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS  ON  CORRUPTION
Dependent  GRAFTa  (1)  (2)
Infrastructure  Rating  0.498**  0.397*
(2.8)  (1.81)
Soft Budget Constraint  -0.008  -0.004
Index  (-1.4)  (-0.57)
Entry  Barriers  0.628**  0.51**
(3.48)  (2.19)
Legal Effectiveness  -.0545*  -0.44*
(3.17)  (-2.07)
Bankruptcy Law Index  0.077  0.0852
(0.68)  (0.74)
Trade System Index  0.112  0.064
(1.25)  (0.59)
Democratic Reform Index (1996)  0.445'F*  0.3754**
(6.54)  (3.43)
GDP per capita  -0.00004
(-0.82)
Observations  19  19
R2  0.938  0.942
T statistics  for "HO: parameter = 0" in parentheses.
m*  indicates  statistical  significance  at 95% level,  * at 90%.
a Graft is measured  on a scale  of-2.5 to 2.5  with higher  values  corresponding  to lower corruption. To make the results
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